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AN APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
RALPH F. FucHs*
I. OLD AND NEW APPROACHES
Administrative law is being subjected to a new and realistic ap-
proach on the part of many of those who are concerned with it. The
problems that are thought to compose it have to do more and more with
the practical advantages and -disadvantages of different ways in which
administrative agencies proceed and less and less with the conformity
of administrative organization and procedure to preconceived notions
of government.
A decade ago the talk was all about the relation of "administrative
justice" to "the supremacy of law", of administrative procedure to due
process of law, or of administrative functions to the separation of
powers. Today, emphasis is likely to be placed upon the fate of specific
public interests and private rights under the control of particular ad-
ministrative agencies. "Vertical" studies of single agencies have super-
seded over-all discussions of administrative law as the principal addi-
tions to the literature of the subject.' Synthesis of the knowledge thus
gained into new standards of administrative organization and procedure
awaits further progress in studies now going forward or later to be
made.
The new approach, if it may be called that, has not yet generated a
concept of administrative law which is appropriate to it. Under the
older approach, the possible disregard by administrative agencies of
supposedly established governmental norms was the measure of rele-
vance of the matters to be studied.2 Due process of law was thought to
require something very much like judicial process, and the "rule of
law" (in the sense of supremacy of law) to demand the decision by a
court of most of the vital matters affecting private interest that arise
in the course of governmental administration. The separation of powers
was assumed to requite the performance of various "functions" in
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
'DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936); HENDIERSON,
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924); PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COM-
MISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES (1927); SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERcE COMMIsSION (5 vols., 1931-1937); VAN VLECK, TH. ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932). The Attorney General's Committee on Administra-
tive Procedure is at present gathering data by means of individual studies of
federal agencies. See its monographs 1-11 (mimeographed, 1940). In regard to
the practical approach see Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal
Administrative Law (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 647.
' See Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the Constitution (1929) 23 Am
POL. Sc. REv. 32.
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governmental administration by different agencies, duly separated from
each other. The -emergence of new regulatory agencies in which these
norms clearly were not observed was the phenomenon with which critics
of administrative law dealt.3 Some opposed; some justified; but all
seemed to agree where the problems lay.
It may not be particularly important to define administrative law
-upon some new basis at this time. So long as studies go forward that
-throw light upon what is transpiring in particular agencies and suggest
ways of improvement, it is not essential that the boundaries of the sub-
ject be clearly marked. It is possible, however, that older concepts of
the subject may becloud men's judgments as to what is significant in
administrative law and as to what requires remedy. If so, a new con-
cept should be evolved.
Under the former approach, preoccupation with due process of law
and the "rule of law" has produced some bad results. Judicial deter-
mination of questions of "jurisdictional fact ' 4 and questions of "con-
stitutional right" has been held to be necessary as a matter of due
process in various classes of proceedings. Nobody knows by what
token a jurisdictional fact may be recognized or why a court is par-
ticularly qualified to pass upon one.0 Neither has it been satisfactorily
explained why some questions of "constitutional right" should be re-
served to the courts.7 These difficulties may justly be charged to pre-
occupation with the due process clause and the "rule of law" in
considering the problems of administrative law. Unwarranted insistence
upon some attributes of court proceedings in connection with adminis-
trative determinations springs from the same cause.8 In the main,
however, the requirements of due process and of the "rule of law" must
be determined on practical grounds, since the phrases themselves are
vague and there is an absence of recognized sub-concepts to apply.9
Due process may mean many things; in relation to administrative pro-
ceedings it necessarily means such differing processes as are reasonably
adapted to different specific matters. The "rule of law" can only mean,
in the last analysis, those ways of determining rights and duties which
'See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrathe Law
Theory (1938)'47 YALE L. J. 538.
'Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. ed. 598 (1932).
'Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct.
527, 64 L. ed. 908 (1920); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U. S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 80 L. ed. 1033 (1936).
' Dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 65,
52 Sup. Ct. 285, 298, 76 L. ed. 598, 621 (1932).
7Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies (1921) 27
W. VA. L. Q. 207.
'Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 298 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 654, 80
L. ed. 1015 (1936). See Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 519, 526 et seq.
I FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMRICAN LEGISLATION (1917) passim.
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the courts are willing to approve as suitable to particular situations. In
other words, to focus upon due process and the "rule of law" in con-
sidering the problemis of administrative law is not in the main to adopt
an unrealistic approach.o
It is otherwise with respect to the separation of powers as the doc-
trine is usually applied. Not only is its relation to the problems of ad-
ministrative law frequently regarded as more fundamental than that of
the other doctrines mentioned, but it is also deemed to have a specific
content which is definitely inconsistent with the manner in which ad-
ministrative agencies usually function. Indeed, the exercise of "legis-
lative" and "judicial" "functions" by officials in the executive branch
of the government has frequently been stated to be in itself the identi-
fying badge of those agencies that are of concern to students of admin-
istrative law.1" Even when this "commingling of functions" is not
opposed, it is regarded as an anomaly. 12 More often it is looked upon
as an evil.' 3
Such a view of the relation of administrative law to the separation
of powers may produce difficulties. When it accepts, rather than op-
poses, the "commingling" of functions it suggests no means of recon-
ciling the continuance of the "anomaly" with a constitutional doctrine
that remains explicitly in effect in many jurisdictions and binds the
courts in all. Conflict and misunderstanding are likely to result.' 4 If
this view is correct, it indicates that modern government and the sep-
aration of powers are incompatible. The establishment of other govern-
10 Compare the conclusion of Mr. A. H. Feller, Administrative Procedure and
the Public Interest: The Results of Due Process, 25 WASH. U. L. Q. (April,
1940), that, thus far, the application of the due process clause to administrative
procedure, although hampering and productive of some threat for the future, has
not on the whole prevented the service of the public interest.
11 (1934) 59 A. B. A. REP. 541 ; BLACHLY AND OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEC-
ISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934) ; terms of reference of the (English) Com-
mittee on Ministers' Powers, in Report of the Committee (1932) at v; Stason,
Administrative Tribunals-Organization and Reorganization (1938) 36 MIcH. L.
REv. 533, 535-536.
1" STASON, CASES AND 'MATERIALS ox ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS (1937) 4.
13 (1936) 61 A. B. A. REP. 727. "The act itself made for an arbitrary ad-
ministration by investing the board with legislative, executive and judicial powers,
making it prosecutor, jury and judge all in one-a merger of functions it took
centuries of struggle to unscramble in the interest of justice for the common
man." Objection of Republican Program Committee to the National Labor Re-
lations Act, N. Y. Times. Feb. 19, 1940, p. 2. col. 4.
1" "Either the constitutions have been violently disregarded in the union of all
the powers in each one of the departments, and in certain administrative officers.
or ... the distinction between the departments was not intended to be based
upon differences existing in the nature of the powers to be exercised by each
department." BONbY, SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT POWERS (1893) 46.
A related result is the view that certain administrative acts should not be sub-
ject to procedural requirements or to judicial review on the simple ground that
they are "legislative". See Brookings Institution, Press Release for use Feb. 23,
1940, p. 3, stating objections to the proposals contained in the Logan-Walter Bill
(76th Cong. S. 915) with respect to administrative rule-making.
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mental safeguards would be furthered by an explicit repudiation of the
doctrine of separation. Before the death knell is rung upon the historic
doctrine,' 5 however, it would be wise to examine its precise nature more
closely and to determine with certainty whether the sacrifice is really
necessary. It may be found that, in fact, the doctrine of separation has
not lost its vitality; that it is no more incompatible with administrative
agencies than with other aspects of government; and that the measure
of what is important in administrative law lies elsewhere. In short, the
separation of powers, when rightly viewed, is neither more nor less
relevant to administrative law than to other aspects of government.
Administrative law should be defined and studied from an entirely dif-
ferent angle.
II. THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
By its terms, the doctrine of separation has reference to "powers".
The critics of "commingling" usually refer to "functions".' 0 Unless
the two are the same, ambiguity lurks in this interchange of words.
Whatever may be intended by the words "powers" and "functions"
as variously used, there undoubtedly are two distinct classes of actual-
ities which these words suggest and which should be known by different
names. The one consists of governmental tasks, such as the enactment
of statutes, the appointment of officers, the regulation of the currency,
and the decision of cases in law and equity, which the constitutions in
fact apportion among the three departments of government and which
might well be called "powers". The other consists of processes, or
types of governmental operations, such as rule-making, the issuance of
orders to named individuals, or physical interference with property,
which might be called "functions". Now the doctrine of separation may
conceivably have reference to the distribution of either of these actual-
ities among the departments of government; it can scarcely have refer-
ence to both. It may mean, in theory, that each department shall per-
form those tasks assigned to it and shall not interfere with the other
departments in their similarly allotted work. Or, it may mean that the
processes which are involved in performing the tasks of government
belong, respectively, to the three departments according to a predeter-
mined scheme. But it cannot mean that each governmental task involves
a single process and that both the task and the process belong to a single
" Root, Public Service by the Bar (1916) 41 A. B. A. REP. 355, 368.
" "The legislative department will in a normal case exercis.e all the legislative
functions; the executive department, all the executive functions; the judiciary
department, all judicial functions. Any other distribution would lead to a con-
fusion of powers. This is the legal consequence of the separation of powers."
WYMAN, PRINCIPLES OF AnMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVFRNING TIIE RELATIONS OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903) 62.
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government department, for it seems obvious that the performance of
many of the tasks of each department requires processes which are also
involved in the tasks of other departments. Enacting statutes, admin-
istering the maritime safety laws, and deciding cases all involve the
making of investigations and the preservation of order at hearings, by
direct action against disturbers if necessary. Appropriating money for
a bureau, issuing a license, and entering a money judgment all involve
decisions. Regulating the coinage of money, enforcing the food and
drug laws, and issuing an injunction all involve the exercise of dis-
cretion and the laying -down of rules to govern future conduct. The
departments cannot call upon each other to carry on these processes
and still perform their tasks in separation. To apportion the tasks of
government among the departments means to duplicate the processes
within the departments; to distribute the processes means to divide
each task.
The meaning of the separation of powers is confused, of course, by
the fact that some of the governmental tasks which have been appor-
tioned among the departments cannot stand alone. They are partial
tasks, which must be completed by other departments. The President
nominates; the Senate advises and consents. Congress "regulates" by
enacting statutes which the executive in part enforces, and which, at
the same time, give rise to cases in law and equity. Congress establishes
courts that to some extent are managed by the executive and which pro-
ceed to render decisions by virtue of somewhat independent constitu-
tional authority. It is easy to conclude not only that governmental tasks
are sometimes divided, but also that they are, or should be, divided ac-
cording to an underlying logic which the separation of powers was
intended to impose.
Historically, there seems to be relatively little authority for this
view. As previously noted, the Federal and state constitutions actually
distribute tasks, not processes, among the departments. 17 The "powers",
it is true, are also assigned generally, by name, to the three depart-
ments.' 8 The significance of this fact turns upon what these powers
were thought to embrace at the time they were assigned. Evidently,
they signified the tasks specifically assigned and others like them, which
pertained to the three -departments. Montesquieu speaks of the three
powers of enacting laws, of* executing the public resolutions, and of
17 See HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (1935)
135 ff."' "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States .... U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, §1. "The executive power shall be vested
in a President of the United States. . . ." Id. Art. II, §1. "The judicial power ...
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. Art. III, §1.
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judging the crimes or differences of individuals.' 9 Nowhere does he
analyze the processes that are involved in carrying out these powers or
indicate that there are processes which are sacred to particular depart-
ments, nor does such an analysis appear in the writings of any of the
fathers. At most there are a few comments upon certain characteristics
of the way in which the three departments proceed with their work.20
It seems to have been enough for the older expounders of the separation
of powers that they were supporting a practical division of labor in
government, and one guarding against tyranny, in such matters as
treaty-making, impeachment, appointments to office, enactment of stat-
utes, and law enforcement. 2 1 Flexibility in the apportionment of tasks
and parts of tasks was recognized as desirable, so long as no department
came to possess the "whole power of another department" ;22 for by the
sharing of powers the operation of checks and balances might be
promoted.
23
It could scarcely have been otherwise under a theory predicated, as
Montesquieu's was, upon the British government, which was being
applied to a new government by men who had British institutions in
mind. 24 A consistent separation could scarcely emerge in the British
government, which began with all powers centered in the King, supple-
mented by that incipient legislature, the Curia Regis, and aided by the
Council in undifferentiated official matters-a government in which spe-
cialization of organs and differentiation of functions took place only
"1 MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (London, 1823) bk. XI, c. 6."The application, "according to the principles of right and justice", of the
"constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases" is "not altogether
without intricacy or difficulty" or lacking in the need "of skill in the science of
jurisprudence". 1 JAMES WILSON, WOliS (Chicago, 1896) 363. "In planning,
forming, and arranging laws, deliberation is always becoming and always useful"
and in their execution vigor, speed, and even secrecy are necessary. Id. at 358.
21 Recent commentators, seeking to depict the present status of the doctrine of
separation, have written in similar terms. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS (1935)
C. IV; WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1936) c. V;
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 'OF THE UNITED STATES (1910) cC.
LXIII, LXIV, LXV.
* 22 Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers"
(1935) 2 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 385, 390 (Montesquieu), 393 (Blackstone), 400 (John
Adams), 407 (Madison).
22 THE FEDERALIST, no. XLVII. "If it be asked why people were so unwise
... as to hamper government by division of authority and by checks and bal-
ances, the answer is simple: such was the kind of government the leaders and
probably men in general wanted .... In some ways the most marked develop-
ment of the idea of popular government froui that time to this has been the
development of the belief that governments, strongly directed by popular opinion,
should be competent and active-a change from the belief that governments
should not do things to the belief that they should do things." McLAUGHLIN, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1935) 117. See also Cheadle,
The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 892, 893.
4 "The separation which was intended to be enforced by the constitutions was
based upon historical rather than purely scientific distinctions." BoNDY, SEPARA-
TION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS (1893) 46.
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slowly and always incompletely as interests clashed and official burdens
multiplied. 25 No consistent separation has in fact emerged.20
It may be argued, however, that whatever may have been the case
historically, it is possible today to separate governmental processes, or
functions, into three classes which correspond to the three departments
of government and to assign each class to the proper department. It
may be contended that the fathers sensed the possibility of such a classi-
fication, even if they did not fully develop it, and that the realization
of the separation of powers today demands an end to the "commingling
of functions" in the hands of administrative agencies. To test the va-
lidity of such a contention requires an exploration of the possible baset
for classifying governmental "functions" into categories.
The members of the assumed triad of functions can be defined with
reference either to their roles in the governmental process, to the me-
chanics of their performance, or to the official acts in which they eventu-
ate. Thus, legislation may be either the formulation of the will of the
government, or law-making; the deliberative methods usually employed
in the framing of statutes; or the enactment of general regulations.
Similarly, adjudication, or the "judicial" function, may be the determi-
nation of particular rights and duties according to law, the method of
hearing and deciding cases and controversies, or the formulation of
judgments or orders of specific application. It is also possible to define
functions with reference to the authorities performing them, and this
is perhaps the traditional way of distinguishing legislation from other
governmental functions.27  But, obviously, such a definition furnishes
no means of determining who are the authorities that should be perform-
ing these functions. All of the enumerated definitions of legislation and
adjudication have been advanced at various times by different writers
and courts.
That legislation is the formulation of the will of the government is
the essence of the Benthamic analysis, the purpose of which is to lay
bare the bases for wise legislation from the standpoint of utility.2 8
25 ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1927) 245; MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1883, pub. 1926) 60-75, 90-92, 133-137, 179-190, 195-226,
245-246, 251-275, 292-320, 383-421; MCILWAINE, HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT
(1910) vii-viii, 22, 216 et seq., 313-328; Goebel, Constitutional History and Consti-
tutional Law (1938) 38 Cor. L. REv. 555, 559, n. 11; Weeks, Legislative Power
Versus- Delegated Legislative Power (1937) 25 GEO. L. J. 314, 319-322.
"8 Carpenter, The Separation of Powers i; the Eighteenth Century (1928) 22
Am. POL. Sci. REv. 32, 36-37. "The more we study our constitution in the present
or in the past, the less do we find it conform to any such plan as a philosopher
might invent in his study." MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 25, at 197. As to the
present blending of the legislative and executive departments, see id. at 382-387,
392-403, 415.
Akzin, The Concept of Legislation (1936) 21 IoWA L. REv. 713, 728.
2 BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1789) cc. I-IV; intro, to id. (2d ed. 1823). Montesquieu's conception of legis-
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Neither Bentham nor Austin, whose philosophy is linked with his, denied
the creative capacity, or legislative quality, of the authoritative decision
of particular cases, when uncontrolled by prior statutes.29 Bentham
advocated statutes in preference to -decisions as means of creating law,
because of their asserted superiority in clarity and knowability and the
greater rationality and completeness which are attainable by means of
them.3 0 Bentham, in short, was concerned with the content of legisla-
tion, however effected, and with statutes as the best form of legisla-
tion. He was not led into an identification of legislation, considered
as law-making, with legislation as a "power" exercised by a particular
branch of the government.
The definition of legislation as law-making is not greatly different
from the oft-repeated modern view that it involves determining what
the law "shall be". 3 ' Sometimes it is said that legislation is the func-
tion of determining policy-and it is noteworthy that the classic analysis
of governmental functions into policy-determining and policy-executing
accords the executive a full share in the former.8 2
Related to the foregoing definitions of legislation is the more juristic
one, that: "Legislation is the creation by the state of a right, . . . duty,
or status not dependent on the existence of a previous right, duty, or
status .... ,,33 By contrast, "Adjudication is the imposition of a specific
duty in personam, or of a liability, or the granting of a right or status
which is dependent on a previous right or duty, in that it is imposed
by way of giving effect to a right or duty determined to exist or to
have existed, or by way of redress or punishment for its violation."8 4
Thus law-making and law-executing, policy-determining and policy-
executing, right- and duty-creating and right- and duty-declaring, which
lation seems to have been on the whole the same. Cf. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES
OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION (1934) 20: "Properly speak-
ing, the legislative function is simply that of law making." See also BONDY, op.
cit. supra note 14, at 41.
" AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (1861) 10, 23, 148-149; BENTHAM, COMMENT ON
THE COMMENTARIES (ed. Everett, 1932) 125, 168, 190.
30 Id. at 187, 213-214; BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (ed. London 1931)
156-157. Compare BENTHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL CODE. 9 WORHS (1843) 8.
32 WILLOUPHBY, Op. cit. supra note 21, at 1264, quoting Mr. Justice Field,
dissenting, in Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 761, 25 L. ed. 496, 516 (1879) ;
Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852), quoted in
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 407, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, 351, 72
L. ed. 624, 629 (1928).
" GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1905) 325.
" Green, Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 369, 373.
"'Ibid. "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist....
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions
by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those sub-
ject to its power." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line CO., 211 U. S. 210, 226, 29
Sup. Ct. 67, 69, 53 L. ed. 150, 158 (1908).
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are alternative statements of the same concepts, stand in contrast to
each other in one classification of the functions of legislation and ad-
judication.
When the basis of classification is shifted from the office of these
functions to the methods whereby they are carried on, the definition of
legislation becomes less clear-cut. It is evident, however, that delibera-
tion upon numerous factors entering into a legislative determination is
the essence of the matter. "Consultation is necessary in the making
of laws. The defect or grievance they are intended to remove must be
distinctly perceived, and the operation of the remedy upon the interests,
the morals, and the opinion of the community profoundly considered."3  f
The corresponding definition of adjudication is more clearly put. "Gen-
erally speaking I understand the judicial function to be the power to
hear and determine a controversy and the power to make a binding
decision, sometimes subject to appeal, which may affect the person or
property or other rights (interests) of parties involved in the dis-
pute."3 6 In this view, a function is "judicial" 'despite its involvement of
policy-determination or the issuance of a "rule of conduct" as its end
product, if the adversary type of hearing is employed in its perform-
ance,3 7 i.e., if a "controversy" in some technical sense is present.
Conversely, an investigation of a claim by non-adversary methods is
not an adjudication, even though the matter was susceptible to treat-
ment as a controversy.
3 8
Definitions of legislative and adjudicative functions upon the basis
of the official acts in which they eventuate have been more usual re-
" 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES (12th ed. 1873) 271. See also 1 GOODNOW, CONI-
PARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1893) 10; 1 WILSON, WORKS (ed. Chicago, 1896)
358. To the end of securing the proper deliberation, the representative assembly"should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large" so as to mirror
their thoughts and interests and "to do strict justice at all times". ADAMS,
Thoughts on Government (1776) in 4 WORKS (1851) 195. "There is an obvious
difference between legislative determination and the finding of an administrative
official not supported by evidence. In theory, at least, the legislature acts upon
adequate knowledge after full consideration and through members who represent
the entire public." Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 197, 54 Sup. Ct. 148,
151, 78 L. ed. 260, 266 (1933).
" Win. A. Robson, testifying before the Committee on Ministers' Powers.
Minutes of Ev. (1932) 64. In the ensuing discussion Dr. Robson defended his
view that "controversies", to which the hearing and appeal procedure should ap-
ply, can be recognized and distinguished from other issues arising in the course
of administration. Id. at 64, 81. As to the confusion in the American cases see
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1926) 4n.
s "The knowledge of facts upon which legislative action is based, exists, for
the most part, in the minds of the members, and they depend very little upon
facts specially communicated by evidence .... On the other hand, courts can
only act upon knowledge of facts communicated upon the trial by evidence."
Benton, The Distinction between Legislative and Judicial Functions (1885) 8
A. B. A. REP. 261.
"United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 14 L. ed. 42 (U. S. 1851) ; cf. La
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. 168, 44
L. ed. 223 (1899).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cently than either of the types of definitions just discussed. General
rules on the one hand and, on the other hand, orders or official acts
which by their terms are directed to specified situations or individuals
are the principal types of governmental acts for this purpose. The
former seem to bear an analogy to statutes, the latter to the judgments
and decrees of courts. It is natural, therefore, to speak of these acts
as legislative and judicial. Legislation, it is said, "consists of an ab-
stract formulation of a general rule";39 "adjudication operates' con-
cretely upon individuals in their individual capacity".
40
The last-mentioned conception of legislation and adjudication pre-
vails in writings which stress the "commingling of functions". Thus,
the 1934 report of the American Bar Association committee takes the
view that legislative functions consist of "the formulation of rules and
regulations and the modification thereof to keep pace with progress".
41
Adjudication, on the other hand, is "the application of law to particular
individuals on particular states of facts".
42
Executive functions have not been similarly defined. Although the
final execution of the will of the state is sometimes said to be the
essence of the executive function, it has never been supposed that the
hangman, the sheriff, and the soldier were the sole, or even the principal,
functionaries in the executive department. In truth, the variety of the
determinations, processes, and acts of the executive has always been so
great that they could not possibly be crowded into a single category,
upon whatever basis. Since it is seldom contended in these days that
executive functions are wrongly reposed in other departments,
43 it is
not necessary to identify them with precision for present purposes.
The foregoing review of the possible definitions of legislative and
judicial functions demonstrates the invalidity of contending that the
"commingling" of these functions, however defined, in the hands of
the executive is a violation of the separation of powers. All of the
functions have always been exercised in conjunction by each of the
='ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1927) 238; WILLIS, THE PARLIAMENTARY
POWERS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933) 49." DcKixsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1926)
21. Dickinson warns specifically against identifying the function of adjudication
as thus defined with "a function which our courts have pronounced to be 'judicial'
for constitutional purposes". Id. at 22. It is essential to the latter that it even-
tuate in judgments that are enforcible without further resort to legislation or
discretionary administrative action. Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561, 17
L. ed. 921 (U. S. 1865).
"Report of the Special Committee on Admninistrativ' Law (1934) 59 A. B. A.
REPi. 539, 543. See also 58 id. at 410 (1933), 61 id. at 727 (1936).
261 id. at 726 (1936), quoting an address by Dickinson before the Judicial
Section of the American Bar Association.
" Occasionally, of course, the judiciary resists the imposition upon it of duties
that are more properly "legislative", or non-judicial. See Fuchs, Concepts and
Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
538, 555.
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departments. No one has even supposed that the executive does not
determine policy as# well as the legislature; that courts do likewise,
although in lesser degree, is now familiar learning. Rights must be
determined by executive officers as well as courts. Any policy-deter-
mining body in the executive branch must employ deliberative processes
resembling in some degree those of the legislature. A dispute before
an executive agency must be resolved pursuant to a framing of issues,
an investigation, and a decision that can differ in name and in inci-
dentals, but not in fundamental nature, from the elements that reside
in judicial methods. The public must always be informed by ordinances,
orders-in-council, or executive regulations, and by rules of court,
4 4
as well as by statutes, what is expected of it in certain situations. An
executive officer or board, no less than a court, would be at a loss
how to proceed if its commands could not be communicated to persons
named therein. In short, the various definitions of legislative and judi-
cial functions embrace virtually all the possible processes of govern-
ment. Each of them includes processes that no branch of the govern-
ment can dispense with. It certainly is not the purpose of the separa-
tion of powers to take away from any department those means of doing-
its work which it has always employed and must continue to employ if
it is to carry on its tasks.
If, as seems to be the case, the "commingling of functions" in a
governmental agency, whether "administrative" or not, does not fall
under the condemnation of the separation of powers, there is no occa-
sion to refer to administrative agencies as a "fourth branch" of govern-
ment.45 Structurally they are, for the most part, clearly in the execu-
tive branch, performing, as do practically all executive agencies, the
tasks entrusted to them by the legislature. Even the "independent"
boards and commissions do not occupy a unique position, for inde-
pendent authority in the uncoordinated heads of a plural executive is
common in American state government. The sole constitutional prob-
lem related to the separation of powers that surrounds any of these
agencies to a greater extent than other agencies grows out of the fact
that the "independent" federal agencies seem to violate the constitu-
tional provision which vests the entire executive power in the Presi-
'dent.4 6 Partly for this reason, these agencies are often referred to as
legislative and as designed to carry on the work of Congress. If this
is a sound view, it need occasion no concern that legislative agencies
"For a discussion of the constitutional questions surrounding the rule-making
power of the courts, see Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court
Affecting Procedure (1937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 459.
,l Or to exempt them from the doctrine of the separation of powers. Berle,
The Expansion of American Administrative Law (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 430.
" President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report (1937) passi-m
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are carrying on order-issuing and licensing, as well as rule-making, func-
tions. Legislatures themselves have traditionally performed all of
these.
47
To maintain that the separation of powers does not inhibit the
"commingling of functions" is not to contend that the doctrine has no
application to administrative agencies. It has exactly the same mean-
ing for them as for other governmental agencies-a meaning which
centers, as the history of the doctrine indicates that it should, upon
power. Under our system of government, no agency should be per-
mitted to exercise a degree of power, in relation to small matters or
large, which renders it unduly dangerous to human freedom. Govern-
mental authority with respect to any subject must be divided, or its
exercise checked upon, in such a way as to minimize the danger of
abuse. Thus understood, the doctrine of separation is practical in
nature and not confined by any logical scheme. It is political rather
than legal and only to a slight extent enforceable by courts. In rela-
tion to administration, its chief significance lies in a limitation, which
the courts at times undertake to enforce, against the vesting of too
broad a discretion in executive officers.48 The exercise of adequate
discretion for dealing with the problems of a complex society and the
simultaneous provision of sufficient safeguards against the abuse of
discretion are the two clearest needs of modern democratic govern-
ment.49 The separation of powers has a role to play in preventing the
second of these needs from being ignored.
III. A REORIENTATION
If, then, the traditional constitutional doctrines fail as the basis
of an acceptable approach to administrative law, the question of a satis-
factory alternative naturally arises. It was suggested at the beginning
of this article that a newer approach to administrative law has arisen
which takes account of practical considerations relating to the operation
of administrative agencies. But one naturally asks, practical considera-
tions from the standpoint of what interests and with respect to what
agencies? For, clearly, not all that government affects and not all of
Haines, The Adaptation of Administrative Law and Procedure to Constitu-
tional Thepries and Principles (1940) 34 Am. PoL. Scr. REv. 1, 5. The 70th Con-
gress by special acts granted 376 permits for the construction of bridges over
navigable rivers. Fuchs, The Quantity of Regulatory Legislation (1930) 16 ST.
Louis L. REv. 51, 54.
"I In the guise of invalidating delegations of "legislative" power. Fuchs. Con-
cepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 538, 545.
"' Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of Discretion
(1939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REV. 954; Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: Eco-
nomic Improvisation by Public Authorities (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 425.
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the agencies of government are embraced in the study of administrative
law, and the term "administrative" remains to be defined.
It has been suggested that the newer, specialized "tribunals" which
exercise regulatory power over particular industries or over particular
phases of economic activity are the significant administrative agencies. 50
But this approach niinimizes an imposing array of economic regu-
latory agencies that have existed for a much longer time,51 as well
as agencies, old and new, which affect non-economic aspects of life.
5 2
Unless there are significant differences between the functioning of the
indicated newer agencies and those which are left out of the picture,
there seems to be no justification for making this distinction. Certainly
there is no line of demarcation between the suggested sets of agencies
in the organization of the government, for some of those selected as
"administrative" are contained in the regular departments 5 3 while others
are "independent". Nor do any of those chosen for inclusion have tasks
to perform or functions to carry out which cannot be duplicated in the
agencies omitted. The distinction seems arbitrary and lacking in signi-
ficance.
The basis for a reorientation is supplied by the fact that the present
transcending interest in administrative law arises out of the increased
application of governmental authority to private activity through non-
judicial agencies. For a number of decades prior to 1887, the year of
the Interstate Commerce Act, the "capitalist-constable" conception of
the state 54 had actually prevailed in the United States and had gener-
ated in the minds of men, and especially of lawyers, the view that the
final decision of governmental matters affecting the citizen lay exclu-
sively with the courts,55 carrying out directly the mandates of the legis-
lature. When, therefore, agencies in the executive branch began to
exercise rule-making powers and to deal authoritatively with private
interests on a new and larger scale, it seemed as though the funda-
mental character of the government were being changed. As this
tendency increased, the opposition to it grew. Both reached a culmi-
nation in the New Deal in this country as they had in England a few
years earlier.
"LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
" Notably in the field of banking and in the licensing of occupations. Regula-
tion of safety at sea, which has important economic consequences, has prevailed
since at least the early part of the nineteenth century.
"' Notably health and taxing authorities and those in control of immigration,
penal institutions, and poor relief.
"' Especially those in the Department of Agriculture which regulate agricul-
tural marketing.
" Beard, Individualisn and Capitalism (1930) 1 ENCYc. Soc. ScIENcEs 145,
161. See LYON, WATKINS, AND ABRA.isoN, GOVERNMENT AND EcONOMIC Lim
(Brookings Institution, 1939) c. II.
5 FREUND, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) 17.
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It would be out of place to review again the oft-repeated story of
the clash between increased governmental regulation and the earlier
conception of the state. Its economic roots are evident and its out-
growth in present legislative proposals for curbing "bureaucracy" and
in the opposition to them is a subject of much comment.5 It is im-
portant, however, to point out the falsity of the assumption that control
through executive agencies is something new. Taxation, the licensing
of trades, and drastic powers to safeguard health and safety, to say
-nothing of the price- and wage-fixing that were only a few decades
removed, had been exercised continuously all through the heyday of
Jlaissez faire. In the exercise of these and other governmental powers
the executive branch, as previously pointed out, had exercised all of
the "functions", however defined, which all branches of government
must always employ if they are to carry on their tasks. The phenome-
nion that was new to those who reacted naively against it was the large-
scale regulation of private interests through executive agencies. In that
fact lies the clue to a realistic approach to "administrative law".
Administrative law is simply the law which establishes the proce-
dure and methods of the executive branch of the government in its con-
tacts with private interests and provides for judicial checks upon its
authority. It has its roots deep in the past and embraces old agencies
as well as new. It has come into prominence recently because of the
increased importance of the executive in relation to private affairs. Its
recent applications are on so much larger a scale than before that many
of its problems take on a new aspect, but they are no more unrelated
to what has gone before than modern corporate reorganization is un-
related to the more primitive law of bankruptcy.
Thus defined, administrative law is distinguishable both from the
-substantive law which administrative agencies apply and from the law
of public administration which orders the internal affairs of the execu-
tive branch. The use of the term "administrative law" in a distinct
sense from the "law of public administration" is obviously arbitrary;
yet it is justified by the existence of two fairly distinct sets of considera-
tions attaching to the two fields of law. The procedure of executive
agencies in dealing with private interests is quite a different matter from
the questions of personnel administration, budgetary procedure, ad-
ministrative management, and the like, with which the law of public
administration is concerned.
"' Fuchs, Current Proposals for the Reorganization of the Federal Re.qulatory
Agencies (1938) 16 TEx. L. Rzv. 335; Haines, The Adaptation of Administrative
Law and Procedure to Constitutional Theories and Principles (1940) 34 Am. PoL.
Scr. REv. 1, passim.; Jaretzki. The Administrative Law Bill; Unsound and Un-
-workable (1940) 2 LA. L. REV. 1; McGuire, The American Bar Association's
Administrative Law Bill (1939) 1 LA. L. REv. 550.
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There is, of course, a border zone of considerable size between the
two areas. Both considerations relating to procedure in dealing with
private interests and considerations of administrative efficiency affect
the problem of governmental organization-witness the controversy over
the advisability of "independent" regulatory agencies. 57 Some phases
of personnel administration and of the law relating to public officers
affect the personal interests of officials to such a degree as to involve
them, in effect, as private individuals in relation to the government.
58
Still more noteworthy is the fact that in the modern "service state" many
aspects of governmental management, involving the administration of
publicly-owned utilities, of the public domain, or of state pension and
insurance systems, affect individual welfare to a marked degree, if not
private "rights" in the strict sense. These cannot be left out of the
picture of either administrative law or the law of public administration.
Another possible source of ambiguity in the suggested definition of
administrative law lies in the fact that it relates to the procedure of
executive, as distinguished from legislative and judicial, agencies and
in the further fact that these are not always readily distinguishable.
The Supreme Court has been unable to evolve a clear means of recog-
nizing a fully judicial court as distinguished from one which engages
in administration,5" and it is common to state that some administrative
agencies perform legislative work and are in a sense arms of the legisla-
ture. Ordinarily, however, it is not difficult to determine when an
agency is executive by reason of its place in the organization of the
government. For present purposes, that fact will suffice.
It is, moreover, not primarily a definition but a working concept of
administrative law which is here being sought. And an approach that
is oriented about the involvement of private interest in executive pro-
ceedings directs attention to those problems that have a distinct signifi-
cance. Hence, such an approach gives unity to the subject and permits
its boundaries to be determined by practical considerations. Obviously,
it should be taken to include procedure in rendering public services and
administering benefits;6O for the same necessity for maintaining effi-
cient, fair procedure in dealing with persons not in the public service
exists in these areas of administration as in the field of regulation.
" Fuchs, Current Proposals for the Reorganization of the Federal Regulatory
Agencies (1938) 16 TEX. L. REv. 335, passinm.
5" This is obviously true in relation to pension rights, separation from the serv-
ice, etc.
'Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 49 Sup. Ct. 411, 73 L. ed. 789 (1929);
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 53 Sup. Ct. 740, 77 L. ed. 1356
(1933); Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 53 Sup. Ct. 751, 77 L. ed.
1372 (1933).
"' See, e.g., the careful provisions of Title I of the amended Social Security
Act with respect to procedure in contested old age and survivors insurance cases.
53 STAT. 1362, 42 U. S. C. A. §401 et seq. (Supp. 1939).
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Given such an approach, the investigation of problems of efficiency
and fairness in administrative procedure and judicial review and the
formulation of improved methods can proceed realistically, unhampered
by the unwarranted application of constitutional doctrines. The pur-
pose will be to promote the legitimate public and private interests attach-
ing to administration and not to preserve or to ascertain the fate of
supposed governmental norms. The problems to be dealt with will be
defined with reference to specific agencies, particular interests which
come under the control of the executive, or identifiable functions per-
formed by administrative agencies. 6' To prevent confusion and mis-
understanding the processes, or functions, of administrative agencies
should not be referred to as "legislative" or "judicial", even when these
terms are "softened by a quasi". The dead weight of alleged separation-
of-powers limitations should be cast overboard finally and definitively,
bag and baggage.
Not only will the study of administrative law be released by this
means, but the constitutional, limitations themselves will be given
renewed vitality. Freed from the obscuring fog of fictitious doctrine,
0 2
their actual meaning will stand forth more clearly for legislatures, ad-
ministrative officers, courts, and critics 68 to perceive. Correctly under-
stood, constitutional limitations recall those enduring human interests
which government exists to further and which no administrative scheme
should be allowed to strike down.
" Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV.
259. The only comprehensive attempt to define administrative functions that seems
thus far to have been attempted in English is that of the late Ernst Freund. See
FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE PowERs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928).
"2 For a keenly written, vigorous attack upon "the judicial gloss which has
been superimposed upon" the doctrine of the separation 'of powers in order "to
place obstructions in the way of the incipient efforts to bring under control some
of the unjust and destructive tactics of an industrial regime which were beyond
effective control by the ordinary legal processes", see Haines, The Adaptation of
Administrative Law and Procedure to Constitutional Theories and Principles
(1940) 34 Am. Po,. ScI. REv. 1, 5.
"As to the role of these several classes of individuals in relation to adminis-
trative procedure, see the remarks of the present writer in Symposium on Adinin-
istrative Law (1939) 9 Am. L. ScHooL REv. 139-144.
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